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C. W. F. BADEN-FULLER 
During the 1960s, many believed that the Western world had entered a golden age from 
which recessions such as those of the 1930s had been banished for ever. These beliefs 
were shattered by the events of the late 1970s and early 1980s: from 1973 to 1985, 
Western European and North American industry experienced the severest recession of the 
post-war period. Numerous writers on macroeconomics have examined unemploy- ment, 
stagnation in output and slow growth in productivity; but the major concern of firms and 
their managers was the mounting excess capacity. Rising excess capacity was a key 
indicator pointing to inefficiency, declining competitiveness and the possibility of 
financial collapse for many Western firms. 
The size and pervasiveness of the problem are revealed by figures on capacity 
utilization for manufacturing industry as a whole for several major OECD countries. We 
see from the data in figure 1.1 that capacity utilization was declining in the early 1970s, 
reaching a low at the end of 1975. (Since different countries use different measures of 
capacity utilization, we should compare the changes for each country over time, not the 
levels across countries.) The recovery of the late 1970s was a false dawn as capacity 
utilization declined again in the 1980s reaching an all-time low around 1983, before 
recovery took hold again. Japan was an exception; its capacity utilization figures vary 
more wildly (reflecting scale differences) but it did not suffer as much in the mid-1980s as 
in the mid-1970s. Many argue that the recovery of the Western economies is not yet 
certain as slow growth, high levels of unemployment and excess capacity persist. 
Furthermore, excess capacity is now appearing in many service sectors such as banking. 
Though excess capacity has plagued manufacturing industry for nearly two decades 
surprisingly little research has been undertaken on the prob- lems it has caused for firms 
and their managers.1 Even the obvious questions have not been answered: why did it take 
so long for Western firms to adjust to these events which started in the early 1970s? What 
is it about the Western economic system, the ways in which its markets work, and the 
actions taken by its managers, which caused such slow change? These are the questions 
this book addresses with inter-disciplinary essays from economists, organizational 
behaviourists and business policy academics. 
 Figure 1.1 Capacity utilization in manufacturing industry, for selected major OECD 
countries, 1970-1988 
* Firms operating at full capacity Source: OECD, 
Main Economic Indicators  
 
Evidence, much of it international in scope, is an important feature of this book. Six of the 
authors choose an industry setting for discussion of excess capacity: Bower describes the 
world bulk chemicals industry; Shaw and Simpson, European man-made fibres; Foroutan, 
European bulk steel; Baden-Fuller, UK steel castings; Grant, UK cutlery; and Bianchi and 
Volpato, European automobiles. Three of the papers use more broadly based evidence: 
Harrigan uses a wide sample of US firms to draw out her themes; Daems, a wide sample 
of European industries; Lorange and Nelson, a small sample of US and European firms. 
But in all the chapters the evidence is used to underpin the development of new ideas and 
advance theoretical understanding. Ghemawat and Nalebuff are the only authors to write 
their paper in a wholly formal and theoretical style, yet they too examine the relationship 
between firm behaviour and industrial policy. 
This opening chapter outlines some of the conceptual themes which run through the 
individual papers. It begins by considering the measurement of excess capacity and why 
some firms might wish to create it. Then it tackles the meaty questions of central concern 
- how did unintended excess capacity arise and how was it resolved? 
Intended or Unintended Excess Capacity 
Throughout this book, the writers are concerned with unintended excess capacity, that is, 
with unanticipated falling capacity utilization over time. Moreover, it is dynamic changes 
rather than static measures which are of relevance to firms. This emphasis on measuring 
changes avoids some data problems: changes in capacity utilization are more easily 
measured and compared between firms and between industries than are absolute levels.2 
Of course not all excess capacity is unplanned; variable demand, lumpy investment 
and strategic action to modify the power of competitors are all reasons why some firms 
plan excess capacity. If demand varies by time of day - as in electricity generation; by 
time of year - as in the usage of agricultural machinery; or in a cyclical pattern - as in 
commodity indus- tries, managers may hold excess capacity in off-peak periods to cope 
with anticipated peaks. A cyclical industry will show falling capacity utilization in the 
downturn of the cycle; providing the anticipated upturn occurs there is no inefficiency or 
crisis. Profitability and prices may also move with the cycle - high prices at the peak 
generating sufficient profits to compensate for the lower profits in the troughs. 
To deter entry, incumbent firms may build or increase excess capacity. The implied 
threat is to flood the market after a new entrant appears, destroying the entrant’s 
profitability. Although this strategy may involve investment in plant which may never be 
used and although the actual flooding of the market after an entrant appears can also hurt 
the incumbent firms, given the right conditions such excess capacity can improve the 
incumbent’s profitability. There is a substantial literature on the effective- ness but social 
undesirability of this kind of excess capacity.3 Another reason for excess capacity is 
where investment is lumpy in the sense that the smallest increments to plant are a large 
percentage of the total market. In order to avoid shortages and gaps for entrants, existing 
firms may build plant in anticipation of demand changes.4 
In general the excess capacity discussed in this book was unplanned: demand was not 
sufficiently strong to provide revenues to cover the firms’ financial obligations. In 
contrast to that used to cope with fluctuations in demand, or to effect entry deterrence, our 
excess capacity did not lead to profits for the firms but rather to financial distress and, in 
extreme cases, bankruptcy and total failure. 
Causes of Unintended Excess Capacity 
How did managers allow their firms to suffer from unintended excess capacity? Using the 
chemicals, steel and fibres industries as examples, Bower, Foroutan, Baden-Fuller, and 
Shaw and Simpson point to over- optimistic demand forecasts for the 1970s and 1980s 
based on the high growth years of the 1960s.5 
Despite an evident slow-down in growth in the early 1970s, initially the optimistic 
forecasts of the late 1960s were carried forward with only gradual adjustment. Managers 
saw the early 1970s as a temporary rest or lull before a period of faster growth where 
economies ‘caught up’. This kind of forecast soon became discredited. The next and more 
persistent forecasts were of the same temporary lull followed by more moderate growth 
than before. In retrospect, the astonishing feature of the late 1970s and early 1980s was 
the strength of this kind of optimism. Few managers realized that there might be no 
upward growth in the foreseeable future and that there could be a prolonged recession. 
Optimistic demand forecasts were only part of the cause of excess capacity; they were 
compounded by new building and capacity extension which exceeded even the over-
optimistic forecasts. With the benefit of hindsight these massive investments seem wholly 
unjustified, but at the time managers believed that capacity had to be increased to pre-
empt competi- tors and capture expected demand growth for years to come, for it was also 
believed by firms that increasing market share was the key to increasing profitability.6 
This belief was reinforced by the evidence that the larger-scale newer plants had lower 
unit costs for any given rate of output. Managers therefore built new capacity, expecting 
to gain a relative advantage against existing and potential competition but paying little 
regard to the adverse effect of the new investment on the overall supply and demand 
balance and on average levels of industry profitability.7 Paradoxically, the first signs of 
the recession and the early price wars spurred some firms to advance rather than retard 
these building plans. 
A further problem arose: the cost advantage of the newer, larger plants located in the 
developed Western world often proved illusory because of the threat from less developed 
countries (LDCs), newly industrializing coun- tries (NICs) and the Eastern bloc. Grant 
discusses this issue in the context of the cutlery industry8 and Bower in the context of 
chemicals, though it was also important in bulk steel and many other industries. 
Frequently, the Western-based plants did not embody any radically new thinking, but 
were extensions of older designs modified at the margin. Similar plants were being 
erected in the LDCs, NICs or Eastern bloc where lower labour costs, less stringent 
regulations and other advantages more than often offset higher transport costs and tariff 
barriers. In addition, local government subsidies and soft loans from international 
agencies to these low wage-cost producers made them even stronger competitors, further 
eroding the competitive position of the Western-based producers.  
In other industries, particularly automobiles, over-optimistic forecasting, competitor 
races and low wage-cost competition were only part of the problem; as Bianchi and 
Volpato explain, managers were ignoring some radical changes taking place in the 
composition of demand, in technology, and in their interaction. On the technology side, 
some firms, principally located in Japan, discovered that there were great opportunities 
for reducing costs through adopting new production and delivery technology. One such 
development was ‘just-in-time’, and writers elsewhere have detailed how these systems 
and other process improvements can reduce costs without significantly altering plant 
scale; moreover they can be applied effectively in medium-sized plant.9 Most of the 
literature documents these systems in the Japanese context, but examples also exist in 
Europe.10 
On the consumption side, it was not the lack of demand but its fragmentation and 
changes which caused problems for firms. For cars, Bianchi and Volpato describe how 
reliability, small size and performance became the more valued features and how fashion 
and local tastes were causing European demand to fragment. Elsewhere, others document 
simi- lar effects for textile clothing, domestic appliances and even for producer products 
such as pumps." 
Traditionally designed plants, even those recently constructed, were often unsuitable in 
serving the newly shaped markets because their output was of uncertain quality, their 
product designs were outdated, and the whole production system was inflexible and 
unable to adapt rapidly. In contrast, the new production systems could supply newer, 
more suitable products. They had additional advantages, too, for improving product 
quality had the sometimes surprising effect of lowering costs - in automo- biles in the 
1970s this was one of the sources of the Japanese cost advantages.12 
Thus, it is alleged, in several industries those who adopted the new technologies were 
gaining a double-edged weapon: low cost with greater flexibility. Traditional firms who 
had failed to appreciate these changes found themselves with ‘excess capacity’, and in 
such cases managers often cited insufficiency of customer demand as the cause of their 
problem, whereas in fact it was lack of appreciation of a new competitive environ- ment. 
The Key Issues 
Both the case studies and broader statistical work in this book highlight two major themes 
- the delays in the adjustment process and the poor quality of the final response. Firms 
experiencing excess capacity had difficulty both in grasping the source of their problem 
and in enforcing the appropriate solution. Whilst hindsight presents a clearer picture, at 
the time the scene looked different: firms had a different perspective; sometimes the scene 
was hazy, or worse, they often saw false signals. The authors of this book explain why 
correct problem perception is important. There is no universal panacea to resolving excess 
capacity; for each cause there is a solution, frequently different causes have different 
solutions, and the wrong medicine may make matters worse rather than better. 
Consequently, as Bower, Baden-Fuller, Foroutan, and Shaw and Simpson show, many of 
the collective activities which firms undertook, such as rationalizatio
cartels, were counter-productive, sometimes resulting in more efficient firms quitting the 
industry leaving the less efficient behind; and, as Grant explains, even the ‘free market’ 
did not provide an ideal solution. 
Falling Demand and Excess Capacity 
As Harrigan points out, where the cause of excess capacity is an insuffi- ciency of 
demand or an overbuilding of capacity (rather than a failure to recognize a new set of 
competitive rules) there are several responses: a firm could await the revival of demand, 
encourage other firms to adjust their capacity, undertake internal restructuring of its own 
operations (including quitting) or some combination of the three. 
The question of demand revival has been touched on and it has been noted that in many 
industries no immediate revival took place and that participants took a long time to accept 
that recovery was not imminent. However, revising demand forecasts downwards did not 
lead to immediate action by the firms because many believed or hoped that the burden of 
adjustment would be borne by others. Realizing that if one firm retires capacity, all the 
other players in that industry gain, a dangerous ‘game’ arose where each firm waited for a 
rival to quit. 
The Competitor Game 
Central to excess capacity - and one of the major reasons why it persists - is the belief by 
firms that others will act first. So long as all competitors within an industry hold such a 
view there will be paralysis and deadlock. Management beliefs about competitor 
behaviour may be reinforced by outsiders such as banks, shareholders and governments 
whose interests, as we explain later, may lie in delaying adjustment. The problems caused 
by deadlock are so crucial that there is considerable value in formalizing the ‘game’ as it 
reveals significant insights. Here I use the typical ‘game theory’ exposition adopted by 
economists. 
For simplicity, consider a simple two-player industry. For the given demand assume 
each player knows there will be losses if both remain, A expecting to lose —1.5, B losing 
— 1.0. Each expects profits if the other quits, A anticipating 3.0, B anticipating 2.0. 
(These numbers are used for illustrative purposes and their absolute size is not central to 
the argument.) In the simple case where quitting is achieved without cost, we can see 
from figure 1.2 that there is a dilemma: compared to both staying each firm loses less if it 
quits but finds it more profitable to stay if the rival quits. If the firms are able to collude, 
or make side payments, or either acts in a public-spirited manner, the game resolves itself 
with B quitting and A staying. With side payments A can pay B to quit and still win 
(although the amount B can extract from A depends on relative bargaining power). 
Problems arise if the firms do not, or cannot, collaborate. Deadlock and paralysis is likely 
as each firm may play ‘brinkmanship’ hoping the other will quit. Whilst both remain 
there are losses for both firms and unfreezing may only occur when one party realizes that 
its rival has a superior position or when the losses precipitate financial collapse and 
change of management. 
Such a simple game can be expanded to encompass many players and many time 
periods. Ghemawat and Nalebuff, and Foroutan formally show in expanded models that 
delayed adjustment is likely.13 Such models offer a plausible explanation for persistent 
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The Government Game 
These models can be extended to include governments as extra actors where firms are 
competing internationally. As Daems and Bower explain, each government may believe 
that allowing the closure of plants in its territory not only requires it to shoulder the 
burden of unemployment and other social costs but also helps those firms with plants 
located in other countries. If the local government is unable to pass on some of its costs to 
foreign governments, it may pressurize its local firms to stay in anticipation of forcing 
plants in rival countries to leave. Within the USA, it has been shown that shutdown of 
plants puts a great strain on a local economy and there are incentives for states to set 
themselves against each other even though unemployment benefit is largely (but not 
entirely) a federal cost.14 Within Europe, the problems are even greater, especially as there 
is no formal mechanism for countries to share any of the social burden of plant closure. 
 
 Quality of Adjustment 
 
‘Oligopolistic games’ may cause additional problems. The quality of adjustment may be 
poor - the larger or more efficient plants and firms may retire early and the smaller or 
inefficient firms may hang on longer. If we go back to our simple game, the best 
collective solution for the two firms is for B to quit and allow A to stay. However, if both 
stay firm B stands to lose less in absolute amount than firm A, and if B and A are equally 
resourced B may credibly threaten A by saying it will stay regardless of ,4’s actions. If A 
‘Oligopolistic games’ may cause additional problems. The quality of adjustment may be 
poor - the larger or more efficient plants and firms may retire early and the smaller or 
inefficient firms may hang on longer. If we go back to our simple game, the best 
collective solution for the two firms is for B to quit and allow A to stay. However, if both 
stay firm B stands to lose less in absolute amount than firm A, and if B and A are equally 
resourced B may credibly threaten A by saying it will stay regardless of ,4’s actions. If 
Abelieves B's threat, A will leave, which is socially inefficient. Ghemawat and Nalebuff 
carefully model such a game explaining the private and social losses under robust 
conditions.15 Baden-Fuller’s description of steel castings shows that such games are 
played out in practice. 
 
 
Cartels and Collective Action 
Many executives and government policy makers appreciated the inefficien- cies caused by 
the ‘competitive game’ and sought to resolve these problems by bringing the relevant 
parties together. The logic seemed simple: as it was non-cooperation which seemed to 
cause the problems, any step which increases the incentives to co-operate should improve 
the quality of the adjustment process. In some cases, bringing the parties together 
(something normally forbidden by European and US anti-trust policy) did help the 
process;16 but in several notable instances things got worse. As Baden- Fuller, Foroutan, 
Shaw and Simpson, and Bower note, the mere announce- ment of a meeting often had the 
effect of freezing the process of adjustment. If a firm had decided to exit but had not yet 
destroyed its plant, it balanced up the costs of delaying the implementation of closure 
until the outcome of the meeting, against the chance that by go
be able to extract some money from the other players to implement the decision. In 
complex industries involving many players, the negotiations went on for a long time and 
the freezing process resulted in firms postponing closure decisions for years. 
A second problem arose in the negotiations themselves. The governments had no 
mechanism to force agreement, and everyone came to realize that a meeting around a 
table does not always result in a meeting of minds. The Lazard scheme for steel castings 
(Baden-Fuller) took many months to reach agreement, the European fibres cartel (Shaw 
and Simpson) several years and the European steel cartel (Foroutan) more than a decade. 
Even when agreement was reached, it was realized that there was often no institutional 
mechanism to ensure that the plan was carried out. The Italians repeatedly failed to close 
fibre plants as they promised; only in the steel schemes were solid enforcement 
mechanisms available. 
Accepting the Need for Individual Action 
Bower argues that as long as all players in the industry believed that excess capacity was 
someone else’s fault, no serious resolution was possible. The industry could only cross 
the watershed and move towards reconstruction when each firm recognized that first it 
had to put its own house in order. Whilst large meetings of all firms in the industry were 
usually a hindrance, bilateral deals sometimes helped when they were between parties 
which knew they had a mutual interest in reducing capacity, and were certain they could 
trust each other to keep promises. 
Lorange and Nelson go further than Bower, arguing that the problem stemmed from 
earlier periods of success. Those firms which found it most difficult to change were 
frequently those who were most successful in an earlier period. During periods of success 
organizations may become flabby in ways such as keeping and promoting incompetent 
staff, adopting more cumbersome procedures and allowing fuzzy goals to emerge, all of 
which make subsequent adjustment more difficult. As a result these organizations 
systematically and effectively filter out ‘bad news’ making it doubly difficult to take the 
initiative. The views of Bower and of Lorange and Nelson are given support elsewhere in 
this book; other authors note that reductions in excess capacity were usually achieved 
only after the major players had taken a lead, and this could only occur once major firms 
ignored the competitive ‘game’ and faced up to the reality of failure in their own 
strategies. 
Barriers to Internal Adjustment 
Even when firms believed that it was their duty to act by closing their own plants, the 
obstacles were formidable. Careful analysis revealed that accounting statements drawn up 
on principles of ‘the going concern’ were misleading in guiding closure decisions. Most 
of the capacity which was underutilized was highly specific to the industry or firm and 
durable in nature; although its purchase cost may have been high and its ‘book value’ 
great, its resale value was often low, and depreciation charges (part of accounting losses) 
irrelevant. Grant and Baden-Fuller document these effects in cutlery and steel castings, 
but they are also important in other industries. To make matters worse, European laws 
restrict the ability of firms to abandon their assets and lay off their workforce; assets need 
to be dismantled, ugly or dangerous sites need to be cleaned up and the workforce given 
substantial severance payments. In many of our industries closure was, and still is, an 
investment decision with substantial cash outflows and these provided a further barrier to 
adjustment. 
Firms governed by the profit motive realized that closure was not ‘profitable’, i.e. 
sensible, unless the discounted cash flow of the project was positive. A facility may earn 
accounting losses and experience cash losses and yet it may still be ‘profitable’ to avoid 
closure because the present cost of closure more than outweighs the future losses from not 
closing. The further the economy went into recession, the greater the current abandon- 
ment cost and thus the greater the incentive to preserve excess capacity. These 
realizations provided an important obstacle to those firms wishing to take the initiative. 
There were other obstacles too; in the large, diversified firms where plant closure did not 
necessarily result in dissolution of the firm as a whole, top management’s realization that 
closure had to take place needed hard selling inside the orgnization. Business unit 
managers believed that closure would force them out of a job for a long period of time - 
perhaps for life. Unless the top managers were able to promise work elsewhere, there was 
a strong motivation for more junior managers to subvert the unpleasant decision. 
Moreover, because closure was not just an abandonment but involved complex site clean-
up and recovery of some assets (to provide the cash to fulfil other obligations) closure was 
not an action which could be undertaken by senior management alone; all managers and 
workers needed to be involved. Boards of directors voting to close plants sometimes 
found their desires frustrated by unwilling managers and workers. 
In undiversified firms, where plant closure often meant destruction of the firm, the 
problems were even greater. It was not just junior managers who perceived a lack of 
opportunities - senior managers also faced the same problem. For everyone, plant closure 
meant loss of job and social status with little chance of future employment. No wonder 
many hung on to the bitter end, as Grant’s careful analysis of closures in the UK cutlery 
industry vividly illustrates. The human factor, uncomplicated by competitor be- haviour, 
provides an obvious explanation. Managers resisting closure sometimes found an 
unexpected ally in their shareholders who also wished to stay in business. The 
shareholder incentive was strongest when the book value of the firm was positive, but the 
abandonment value of the firm was zero or negative.17 Remaining in operation could not 
yield less for the shareholders, whereas the costs of staying open were borne by creditors 
- particularly the banks and governments - who were unable or unwilling to force the 
managers to take the ‘sensible’ decisions. Of course, not all managers and shareholders 
adopted this approach. Some saw that they could not easily avoid the consequences of 
failure, and others believed that there were opportunities for regeneration. 
Thus we can see other games operating, this time within the firm between shareholders 
and creditors, between senior management and junior management, and with ample 
opportunities for non-cooperation. 
Changing Dynamics of Competition and Excess Capacity 
Earlier in this chapter we noted that excess capacity may be caused by changes in the 
dynamics of competition. The world demand for many goods such as cars, textiles and 
appliances, although cyclical, has expanded through the last 20 years, and the problem 
facing Western firms in many industries was not an absence of total demand, but a failure 
to serve domestic markets and export effectively. In many industries excess capacity was 
the consequence of misplaced investment in the wrong kind of capacity. This view 
challenges the game-theoretic explanation of the cause of excess capacity advanced 
earlier. 
The essay by Bianchi and Volpato is particularly important in this context. They argue 
that the European automobile market has changed and that the traditional recipe of large-
scale plants producing homogeneous product, so effective in the 1960s, was inappropriate 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Consumer tastes were changing, demanding more 
variety, and technology convergence was eroding the cost advantage of large-scale 
inflexible systems over smaller-scale flexible systems. Firms which were able to embrace 
the newer technologies were able to serve the customer with the new variety. There was 
an additional advantage: the newer systems produced better-quality products, rejects were 
less common and overall costs were also reduced. The industry experienced some firms 
making profits with little excess capacity, at the same time as others made losses with 
much excess capacity: the first group were those which had changed and the second group 
were those which had not. 
Automobiles were not the only sector experiencing the simultaneous features of excess 
capacity among some firms and success among others; the same pattern was noticeable in 
specialist steel, cutlery, textiles and appliances. Foroutan ascribes the success of mini-
mills in the steel industry to their approach, wholly different from that of the traditional 
producers: the mini-mills emphasized small-scale plants and small lot capability.18 Grant 
notes the success of Richardson in the cutlery industry, and elsewhere Grant and Baden-
Fuller describe how Richardson’s success was based on new ways of configuring 
production processes and in providing more variety to the customer.19 The success of the 
Scottish and Italian knitwear industry and of firms like Hotpoint in appliances has been 
ascribed by Baden-Fuller and others to similar factors.20 
The Book 
This introduction cannot do justice to the richness and subtlety of argument contained in 
the essays which follow. Their scope is wide, ranging from theoretical contributions, case 
studies and statistical studies using evidence drawn from many industries and countries; 
they synthesize insights into the problems of excess capacity from the viewpoint of 
economics, organiza- tional behaviour and business policy.  
Critical readers may see this book as a savage indictment of the quality of European 
and Western management, and to some extent they would be correct. Over-optimisim, 
competitor games, intergovernmental games and battles within firms slowed down the 
process of adjustment and com- pounded the substantial adjustment difficulties caused by 
the huge costs and technical difficulties in closing capacity. In many industries, firms 
took an inordinately long time to recognize that past investment in plant and delivery 
capability were outdated or inappropriate for the changing tech- nology and markets. To 
make matters worse, when adjustment came it was often wrong: the wrong plants closed 
in the sense that those which closed were not the least efficient. 
Governments, however, appear in an even worse light, as the careful analysis in this 
volume shows. Even well-intentioned policy makers who acted in good faith believing 
they were promoting economic efficiency are shown to have produced adverse effects in 
steel (Foroutan), steel castings (Baden-Fuller) and fibres (Shaw and Simpson). Their 
interventions have frequently had the effect of delaying the adjustment process and, more 
seriously, causing the quality of the adjustment to be inferior. The real recovery only 
came when management realized that new responses were necessary to conquer declining 
competitiveness. 
Notes 
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profitable and useful in one period becomes ‘obsolete’ in the next period due to 
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such as using pre-painted steel rather than painting the appliance box after it was 
made. 
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